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INTRODUCTION

Courts have a broad arsenal when it comes to issuing sanctions for spoliation
of evidence. The options give courts the flexibility to pair wrongdoing with the
appropriate response but may also lead to inconsistency and confusion. With
amorphous, open-ended instructions from the Second Circuit-such as "the
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Article.
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applicable sanction should be molded to serve the prophylactic, punitive, and
remedial rationales underlying the spoliation doctrine" -or from the First
Circuit-such as "a trial court confronted by sanctionable behavior
should ... take pains neither to use an elephant gun to slay a mouse nor to wield
a cardboard sword if a dragon looms" 2-inconsistencies in the application of
sanctions for spoliation should come as no surprise. In a 2009 panel discussion,
Judge Shira Scheindlin, remarking on judges' duty to carefully mull through the
wide variety of sanctions, rightfully advised that "even with the assistance of an
adroit head waiter, you still need to know when to use each particular kind of
fork."
This Article analyzes the divergent approaches taken by federal courts in the
Fourth Circuit and beyond when issuing sanctions for spoliation of electronically
stored evidence. The variety of preservation abuses on the front end of litigation
make it difficult for courts to decide how to best "level the playing field" by
issuing a sanction for spoliation. As technology continues to advance at warp
speed, the problems that can arise on the front end grow increasingly complex.
For example, in Nucor Corp. v. Bell,4 the continued use of a laptop computer
after a litigation hold was in place led to the sanctionable overwriting of data
stored in the unallocated space of the laptop's hard drive." This data likely
would have remained discoverable had the laptop simply been stowed away.
Of particular importance today is the prevalence of the "adverse inference
instruction," which "permit[s] the jury to infer that unproduced evidence would
be harmful to the case of the withholding party."' This sanction presents its own
set of difficulties, as "[t]here is inconsistency in how courts deal with the
division of fact-finding labor" when issuing an adverse inference instruction.8
As in Nucor, many courts imposing an adverse inference instruction as a
sanction allow the jury to reassess the evidence and determine whether spoliation

1. West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.. 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999).
2.
Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 395 (1st Cir. 1990).
3.
Panel Discussion, Sanctions in Electronic Discoverv Cases: Views fon the Judges, 78
FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 5 (2009). Judge Scheindlin has similarly observed that "[t]he selection of the
appropriate remedy is a delicate matter requiring a great deal of time and attention by a court."
Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d
456, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), abrogatedby Chin v. Port Auth., 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012).
4.
251 F.R.D. 191 (D.S.C. 2008) (Norton, C.J.).
5. See id. at 197.
6.
See id.
7.

GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE

§ 49(B)(2),

at 7-102 (4th ed. 2008): see also Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d
214. 217 (1st Cir. 1982) (quoting 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW § 291, at 228 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 1979)) (defining the adverse inference charge);
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IF), 220 F.R.D. 212, 219 20 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting
Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 97-2307, 1999 WL 462015. at *11 (Mass. Sup. Ct. June 16, 1999))
(citing Byrme v. Town of Cromwell, 243 F.3d 93, 107-110 (2d Cir. 2001)) (discussing adverse
inference charges in general).
8.
Nucor. 251 F.R.D at 202.
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occurred at all.9 Other courts have rejected this approach.10 Instead, they inform
the jury that a sanctionable loss or destruction of evidence occurred and then
allow the jury to infer that the lost evidence Iwas relevant to the case and would
have been prejudicial to the spoliating party.
This Article proceeds in five parts: first, review of general spoliation
principles; second, discussion of the Nucor decision; third, review of post-Nucor
decisions; fourth, analysis of the divergent approaches courts have taken with
regards to adverse inference instructions; and fifth, conclusions. The authors
will argue that adverse inference instructions should inform jurors as a matter of
law that spoliation occurred and then allow them to presume that the lost or
deleted information would have been relevant to the nonspoliating party's case
and harmful to the spoliating party's case. The jurors should additionally be
permitted to decide what effect their finding should have in reaching their
verdict.
II. SPOLIATION LAW: THE LAY OF THE LAND
Like Jean Valjean eluding Inspector Javert, technology is constantly
outrunning the law.'
The disparity is especially prevalent in the realm of
spoliation, where the law is continuously being reworked to prevent new
electronic innovations from lapping the legal doctrines meant to ensure the
preservation of electronically stored information (ESI) while litigation is
anticipated and ongoing.14
This disconnect has not led to leniency for
preservation failures; to the contrary, courts are increasingly willing to sanction
spoliators when the best defense to a claim of spoliation of electronic evidence
is, "my dog ate my email."15

9. Id. at 203; see also Mosaid Techs., Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332. 334
(D.N.J. 2004) (deciding to instruct the jury: "If you find that defendants could have produced these
e-mails, and that the evidence was within their control, and that the e-nails would have been
relevant in deciding disputed facts in this case, you are permitted, but not required, to infer that the
evidence would have been unfavorable to defendants.").
10. See, e.g., Aaron v. Kroger Ltd. P'ship I, No. 2:10cy606, 2012 WL 78392, at *3 (E.D. Va.
Jan. 6, 2012) (finding that evidence had been willfully destroyed and leaving nothing for the jury to
decide on the spoliation issue).
11. See id. at *4 (citing Buckley v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 306, 322 (4th Cir. 2008)).
12. See generally VICTOR HUGO, LES MISERABLES (Charles E. Wilbour trans., Modem
Library 1931) (1862) (telling the story of Jean Valjean, a fugitive on the run); LES MISERABLES
(Universal Pictures 2012) (same).
13. See Tom inkham & Eric Janus, Rationalizing Discovery of Metadata. 81 U.S.L.W. No.
10, at 393 (Sept. 18. 2012) ("The explosion of digital technology challenges settled legal
arrangements. Again and again, legal rules, and the concepts they employ. must adjust to changes
in technology; old paradigms must either stretch and adjust, or make way for entirely new
paradigms.").
14. See Matthew S. Makara, Note, M1y Dog Ate M1y Email: Creating a Comprehensive
Adverse Inference Instruction Standardfor Spoliation of Electronic Evidence, 42 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 683, 703-04 (2009).
15. See id. at 686 87.
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According to one set of scholars, problems regarding evidence preservation
are
particularly acute in the case of electronic information because the
information is often widely dispersed (an employee may have data not
only at work, but on her Blackberry, cell-phone, laptop or home
computer) and is constantly changing on account of routine back-up and
deletion programs, as well as the day to day manipulation of data in the
course of the company's business. 16
As Judge Lee Rosenthal noted, "[s]poliation of evidence-particularly of
electronically stored information-has assumed a level of importance in
litigation that raises grave concerns." 17 A recent study by the Federal Judicial
Center found that in 209 cases in which a party brought a motion for sanctions
due to spoliation of evidence, alleged loss of EST was involved in 53% of the
cases, and alleged loss of ES1 was the exclusive basis for the sanctions motion in
40% of the cases.18 Perhaps more tellingly, in those cases involving alleged loss
of EST in which an order was issued on the motion for sanctions, the motions
were granted 34% of the time and denied 66% of the time,19 whereas for all
cases, motions for sanctions were granted only 28% of the time and denied 72%
of the time.20 These numbers as they relate to loss of EST can only be expected
to rise, as "[i]t is now estimated that over ninety-two percent of information
created and stored is done electronically." 2 1 It is clear that judges are taking the

16.

GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE: STATE AND FEDERAL

CASES AND MATERIALS 973 (10th ed. 2009); see also JOSEPH, supra note 7, § 53(F) (Supp. 2012)
("A great deal of activity relating to computers may constitute spoliation.").
17. Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 607 (S.D. Tex. 2010)
(emphasis added): see also Jodi Kleinick & Mor Wetzler, Navigating the Spoliation Case Law
Divide, N.Y. L.J., June 11, 2012, at S6 ("Recent advances in technology make it easier to create and
maintain ever-growing volumes of electronic data. But this also means data is more easily altered
or destroyed, whether with a single keystroke or automatically through routine system operations.
The challenge of managing electronic data, coupled with the increased ease and opportunity to alter
or delete, has brought preservation and spoliation to the forefront of issues litigated today."); Drew
D. Dropkin, Note, Linking the Culpability and Circumstantial Evidence Requiremnents for the
Spoliation JAference, 51 DUKE L.J. 1803, 1806-07 (2002) (citing David A. Bell et al., Let's Level
the Playing Field: A New Proposalfor Analysis of Spoliation of Evidence Claims in Pending
Litigation, 29 ARIz. ST. L.J. 769, 771 (1997)) ("The prevalence of spoliation in civil litigation is
alarming.... In response to the rise of spoliation cases nationwide, courts are subjecting spoliation
to intense scrutiny.").
18. EMERY G. LEE III, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONs BASED UPON

SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES I (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/DallasMiiniConf EmpiricalData/Federal%20Judicialo20Center.pdf.
19. Id. at 2.
20. Id. at 1.
21. Burke T. Ward et al., Electronic Discovery: Rules for a Digital Age, 18 B.U. J. SCL &
TECH. L. 150, 154 (2012).
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loss of ESI seriously and imposing serious consequences, which can ultimately
amount to millions of dollars.
4. The Elements ofSpoliation
The development of the law regarding sanctions for spoliation of evidence is
well-documented, and recent court decisions have heightened awareness and
discussion of this area of law; therefore, a brief summary of a basic claim of
spoliation should suffice.
"[S]poliation is not a substantive claim or defense but a 'rule of evidence,'
and thus is 'administered at the discretion of the trial court."'2 In federal court,
judicial authority to impose sanctions most commonly springs from tw7o separate
wells: federal common law and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.25 First,
courts are authorized to impose sanctions based on their "inherent power to
control the judicial process and litigation."26 While broad, this power is not

22. See, e.g.. United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 21, 26 & n. I (D.D.C.
2004) (imposing a $2.75 million sanction against a company and issuing $250,000 fines against
individual corporate managers after finding that the defendant destroyed emails on a system-wide
basis after a litigation hold should have been established); see also Dan H. Willoughby, Jr. et al.,
Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the Numbers. 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 790 (2010) ("Ediscovery sanctions are at an all-time high.").
23. The most notable cases include: Pension Committee of the University of' Montreal
Pension Plan v. Banc ofAnerica Securities, LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), abrogated
by Chin v. Port Authority, 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012): Rinkus Consulting Group, Inc. v.
Cammarata,688 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D. Tex. 2010); and Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake
V), 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). A lot has changed since 1991, when one commentator
pleaded that "[w]hat is needed is a change in judicial attitude, to take the problem of spoliation
seriously rather than sweep it under the rug." Charles R. Nesson. Incentives to Spoliate Evidence in
Civil Litigation: The Needfor Vigorous Judicial Action, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 807 (1991).
Nowadays, judges are doing the courts "a great service by laying out a careful analysis of spoliation
and sanctions issues in electronic discovery." Rinkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 611. Some commentators
even complain today that courts are "imposing harsh sanctions" that can be "too strict." Linzey
Erickson. Note. Give Us a Break: Tie (hIequitv ofJCourts Imposing Severe Sanctionsfir Spoliation
Without a FindingofBad Faith, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 887, 892 (2012) (arguing that adverse inference
instructions should only be imposed after a judicial finding of bad faith): see also Win. Grayson
Lambert, Keeping the Inference in the Adverse Inference Instruction:Ensuring the Instruction Ls an
Effective Sanction in Electronic Discovery Cases, 64 S.C. L. REv. 681, 714 15 (2013) (arguing that
the adverse inference instruction should be limited to "cases when the spoliator acts in bad faith if it
is to remain ain effective tool for combating spoliation").
24. Hodge v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 360 F.3d 446, 450 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Vodusek v.
Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 155 (4th Cir. 1995)).
25. See Straitshot Commc'ns, Inc. v. Telekenex, Inc., No. C1O-268 TSZ, 2012 WL 5880293,
at *3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 20, 2012). Unfortunately, courts often do not identify their basis for
imposing sanctions. See Shira A. Scheindlin & Kanchana Wangkeo, Electronic Discovery
Sanctions in the Twenty-first Century, II MiCH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 71, 78 (2004) ("In
37% of the cases [sampled] where sanctions were issued, the court cited no authority whatsoever.");
Willoughby et al., supra note 22, at 800 ("Courts are not always precise in identifying the rule or
statute upon wvhich their sanction decisions are based. In some instances, no basis is identified.").
26. Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001).
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limitless, as the Supreme Court made clear in Chambers v. ?L4SCO, Inc.27:
"Because of their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint
and discretion."28 Even in diversity cases, federal courts look to federal law both
as the source of the authority to impose sanctions and for the rules governing
imposition of sanctions. Second, sanctions may be imposed under Rule 37 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for violating a court order or disrupting
discovery.30 Finally, courts have statutory authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 to
impose costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees on "[a]ny attorney . .. who so
multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiouslv."3'
Under federal common law, a party who reasonably anticipates litigation has
a duty to preserve material evidence that may be relevant to the litigation.32
Failure to satisfy this duty generally amounts to spoliation, i.e., "the destruction
or material alteration of evidence or ... the failure to preserve property for
another's use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation."33
The first step in any spoliation analysis is to determine whether the alleged
spoliator had a duty to preserve evidence and breached its duty through the
destruction of, alteration of, or failure to keep relevant evidence.34 Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the duty to preserve extends to information
that is relevant to the claims or defenses of any party.3 In a corporate setting,
the duty specifically extends to "those employees likely to have relevant
information-the 'key players' in the case." 36 However, courts recognize that
litigants are not required to preserve "every shred of paper, every e-mail or
electronic document, and every back up tape."3 Instead, a party's preservation
obligation, once it reasonably anticipates litigation, is to "suspend its routine
document retention/destruction policy and put in place a 'litigation hold' to
ensure the preservation of relevant documents."38

27. 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
28. Id. at 44.
29. See Hodge, 360 F.3d at 449 (citing Silvestri, 271 F.3d at 590) (noting that in the Fourth
Circuit, federal law governs the decision to impose sanctions in diversity cases); see also Adkins v.
Wolever, 554 F.3d 650, 652 (6th Cir. 2009) ("In contrast to our persistent application of state law in
this area, other circuits apply federal law for spoliation sanctions. We believe that this is the correct
view .
");
D...Flury v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 427 F.3d 939, 944 (11th Cir. 2005) ("We
agree ... that federal law governs the imposition of spoliation sanctions.
Furthermore, in
accordance with the fourth and fifth circuits, we conclude that federal law applies because spoliation
sanctions constitute an evidentiary matter.")
30. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37.
31. 28 U.S.C.§ 1927 (2006).
32. See Silvestri, 271 F.3d at 591 (citing Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d
Cir. 1998)).
33. Id. at 590 (citing West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776. 779 (2d Cir.

1999)).
34. See Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D. N.Y. 2003).
35.
36.
37.
38.

See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Zubulake lK 220 F.R.D. at 218.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 218.
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Second, the court must decide whether the alleged spoliator acted with the
requisite level of intent needed to justify imposition of a particular sanction.39 In
the Fourth Circuit, a court simply needs to find some level of fault on the part of
the spoliating party: "[F]or a court to impose some form of sanctions for
spoliation, any fault ... is a sufficiently culpable mindset,"40 and "bad faith,
willfulness, gross negligence, or ordinary negligence suffices to support a
finding of [sanctionable conduct]."' A sanction may be warranted even when
the relevant documents have been lost through inadvertence.42 Of critical
importance is that there are "nuanced, fact-specific differences among these
states of mind [that] become significant in determining what sanctions are
appropriate. ,,43
Finally, the party alleging spoliation bears the burdens of establishing not
only the duty to preserve and a breach of that duty but also relevance and
prejudice.44 These latter requirements often place litigants between a rock and a
hard place: how does a party show that something it never saw, read, or
possessed was likely relevant to its claims or defenses?4 Courts in the Fourth
Circuit attempt to address this problem by requiring the party alleging spoliation
to "establish[] that the spoliated material addressed topics. or falls into categories
of documents, that would be favorable to the movant's case."4 The moving
party is not required to demonstrate the content of the destroyed documents
"with certainty" ;47 to the contrary, once the moving party shows that the
spoliated material is likely to be relevant, the burden shifts to the party charged
with spoliation to demonstrate irrelevance of the evidence.48 In cases of bad
faith destruction, relevance is presumed.49

39. See Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 529 (D. Md. 2010).
40. Id. (citing Goodman v. Praxair Servs. Inc.. 632 F. Supp. 2d 494, 518. 520 (D. Md. 2009);
Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 101 (D. Md. 2003)).
41. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 803 F. Supp. 2d 469, 497 (E.D. Va.
2011); see also Pandora Jewelry. LLC v. Chamilia, LLC, No. CCB-06-3041, 2008 WL 4533902, at
*9 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2008) (citing Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583. 590 (4th Cir.
2001)) ("The Fourth Circuit requires only that the party seeking sanctions demonstrate fault, with
the degree of fault impacting the severity of sanctions.").
42. See Victor Stanley, 269 F.R.D. at 529 (quoting Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v.
Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 613 (S.D. Tex. 2010)).
43. Id.
44. See id. at 531-32 ("[A] finding of 'relevance' for purposes of spoliation sanctions is a
two-pronged finding ofrelevance and prejudice.").
45. See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. Cl 1-1846 LHK (PSG), 2012 WL 3042943, at
*7 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2012) ("By the very nature of the spoliation, there is no way to know what
the spoliated evidence would have revealed ... ); Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal
Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec.. LLC. 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("It is often
impossible to know what lost documents would have contained.").
46. Kolon Indus., 803 F. Supp. 2d at 498.
47. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rambus Inc.. 439 F. Supp. 2d 524. 561 (E.D. Va. 2006). vacated.,
523 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
48. See id.
49. See id. at 561-62 (quoting Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910, 925 (1st Cir. 1988)).
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B. Available Remedies Once Spoliation Is Shown
"If spoliation has occurred, then a court may impose a [wide] variety of
sanctions, ranging from dismissal or judgment by default, preclusion of
evidence, imposition of an adverse inference, or assessment of attorney's fees
and costs."5o Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure lays out a host of
possible penalties, which include directing that facts be taken as true for
purposes of the action, prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or
opposing claims or defenses, striking pleadings, staying the proceedings,
dismissing the action, rendering a default judgment, or treating the disobedience
as contempt of court.
Countless other sanctions are available for spoliation based on courts'
inherent power to control the litigation. In appropriate circumstances, courts
may sanction improper conduct "by means of the inherent power" even if "that
conduct could also be sanctioned tinder [a] statute or the [Federal] Rules." 52
Examples under this approach include dismissal,5 excluding evidence or expert
testimony, providing an adverse inference instruction,54 fines, cost-shifting,
and enjoining the filing of further actions.5 The available sanctions range in

50. Goodman v. Praxair Servs., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 494, 506 (D. Md. 2009) (citing In re
NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 179, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A). Rule 37 also provides a "safe harbor' provision that took
effect in 2006. under which a court "may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for
failing to provide electronically information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an
electronic information system." FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e). Some courts have applied this provision
narrowly and limited its application to the violation of a court order. See, e.g., Nucor Corp. v. Bell,
251 F.R.D. 191, 196 n. 3 (D.S.C. 2008) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e)) (refusing to apply the safeharbor provision); see also JOSEPH, supra note 7. § 59(A) (Supp. 2012) ("The phrase 'under these
rules is somewhat peculiar because the Civil Rules do not address spoliation except
indirectly .... The principal sanctions power available to punish spoliation [remains] the commonlaw inherent power of the court."). While in 2006 the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules effected
other changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the "new discovery rules ... do not focus on
issues concering the preservation of electronic data or sanctions for its spoliation," and "[c]ourts
continue to be the primary source for the law in these areas." Robert A. Weninger, Electronic
Discovery and Sanctions for Spoliation: Perspectivesfrom the Classroom, 61 CATH. U. L. REV.
775, 801-02 (2012) (citing HAZARD ET AL., supra note 16, at 905).
52. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991).
53. See United States ex rel. Berglund v. Boeing Co., 835 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1053 (D. Or.
2011) (quoting Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 958 (9th Cir. 2006)).
54. See id. (citing Glover v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 1329 (9th Cir. 1993)); Sansung Elecs.
Co., 439 F. Supp. 2d at 540.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 21. 26 (D.D.C. 2004)
(imposing fines on a party "as punishment for their egregious violation").
56. See generally Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am.
Sec.. LLC. 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (listing cost-shifting as a possible sanction).
57. See Annstrong v. Koury Corp., 16 F. Supp. 2d 616, 620 (M.D.N.C. 1998) ("The court is
given substantial discretion to craft appropriate sanctions, and an injunction from filing any further
actions is an appropriate sanction to curb groundless, repetitive, and frivolous suits . . . .").
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level of severity, with dismissal being "the ultimate sanction for spoliation.""
Courts will generally dispose of a case through sanctions only "in the most
egregious circumstances" and when there is a showing of bad faith.60
Because sanctionable conduct begets heavy consequences, attorneys must be
careful what they ask for. An unfounded assertion that an opposing party
spoliated evidence can lead to sanctions against the attorney bringing the claim
from yet another source: Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 6 1
C. The 4dverse Inference Instruction
The sanction of an adverse inference instruction has been called "the oldest
and most venerable remedy" for spoliation.62 Its origin has been traced to the
eighteenth-century English decision of 4rmory v. Delamirie,63 in which a
goldsmith's apprentice tried to trick a chimney sweep's boy that a jewel the boy
found and brought to the goldsmith's shop wxas only worth "three halfpence" by
removing and eventually keeping the stones. 64 The boy brought a claim of trover
against the goldsmith, who refused to produce the stones.
At trial, the chief
justice instructed the jury that "unless the defendant did not produce the jewel,
and shew it not to be of the finest water, they should presume the strongest
against him, and make the value of the best jewels the measure of their
damages." 66 By 1844, the Supreme Court had clearly embraced the adverse
inference doctrine:
All inferences shall be taken from the inferior evidence most
strongly against the part) refusing to produce; but the refusal itself
raises no presumption of suspicion or imputation to the discredit of the

58. Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583. 593 (4th Cir. 2001).
59. Goodman v. Praxair Ser s., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 494, 518-19 (D. Md. 2009) (citing
Sampson v. City of Cambridge, 251 F.R.D. 172. 180 (D. Md. 2008)).
60. Silvestri. 271 F.3d at 593 (citing Cole v. Keller Indus.. Inc.. 132 F.3d 1044, 1047 (4th Cir.
1998)).
61. See, e.g., Anderson v. Wal-Mart Stores. Inc.. No. 2:10-c- 02235-GMN-GWF, 2011 WL
5598331, at *3 (D. Nev. Nov. 16, 2011) ("The Court finds and concludes that Plaintiffs
counsel ... violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by alleging, without
evidentiary support, that Defendant ... intentionally destroyed relevant evidence . . .
62. United Med. Supply Co. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 257, 263 (2007) (quoting Jonathan
Judge, Comment, Reconsidering Spoliation: Common-Sense Alternatives to the Spoliation Tort.,
2001 Wis. L. REV. 441, 444 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also S. Pac. Co. v.
Johnson, 69 F. 559, 569 (9th Cir. 1895) ("The principle of the maxim, 'Omnia praesumuntur in
odium spoliatoris' as applicable to the destruction or suppression of a written instrument raises a
presumption that the document would, if produced, militate against the party destroying or
suppressing it."); Pomeroy v. Benton, 77 Mo. 64, 86 (1882) (referring to the "stern rule recognized
alike in equity and at law embodied in the maxim omniapraesumunturin odium spoliatoris").
63. (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B.): 1 Strange 505.
64. See id. at 664.
65. See id.
66. Id.
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party, except in a case of spoliation or equivalent suppression. There
the rule is that omniapraesurnfu]nturcontra spoliatorem.67
As explained by Justice Stephen Breyer in an opinion written during his
tenure on the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit:
The adverse inference is based on two rationales, one evidentiary
and one not. The evidentiary rationale is nothing more than the
common sense observation that a party who has notice that a document
is relevant to litigation and who proceeds to destroy the document is
more likely to have been threatened by the document than is a party in
the same position who does not destroy the document....
The other rationale for the inference has to do with its prophylactic
and punitive effects. Allowing the trier of fact to draw the inference
presumably deters parties from destroying relevant evidence before it
can be introduced at trial. The inference also serves as a penalty,
placing the risk of an erroneous judgment on the party that wrongfully
created the risk. 68
In a 2011 study by the Federal Judicial Center, the adverse inference
instruction was the most common type of sanction granted; in ESI cases, it was
imposed 57% of the time when courts issued a sanction.69 A previous study in
2004 found that adverse inference instructions were granted in 23% of federal
and state cases in which a sanction was issued] 0
In the Fourth Circuit, to impose an adverse inference, courts do not require a
showing of bad faith." Not all circuits are in accord, as some require a finding
of intentional, bad faith destruction of evidence.72 Even though the standard in
the Fourth Circuit is, comparatively, a lower one, a court's decision of whether
to impose an adverse inference charge is not to be taken lightly. In Zubulake v.

67. Hanson v. Lessee of Eustace, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 653, 708-09 (1844); see also The Pizarro,
15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 227, 241 (1817) (discussing concealment and spoliation of evidence). Stated
simply: "All presumptions are against [a wrongdoer]." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1857 (9th ed.

2009).
68.
1982).
69.

Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 218 (Ist Cir.
LEE, supra note 18, at 2.

70. Scheindlin & Wangkeo, supra note 25, at 77.
71. Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 156 (4th Cir. 1995); see Hodge v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 360 F.3d 446. 450 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting IVodusek, 71 F.3d at 156): see also
Buckley v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 306. 323 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that '"intentional.' 'willful.' or
'deliberate' conduct can support imposition of an adverse inference instruction).
72. See, e.g., Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1111-12 (8th Cir. 1988)
(citations omitted) (finding that the adverse inference instruction is appropriate only where there is
an intentional act wvhich indicates fraud or bad faith). In Rinkus, Judge Rosenthal lays out the state
of the law on this issue. See Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598,
614-15 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (citations omitted).
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UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV),7 the court noted the "in terroren effect of an
adverse inference [instruction]": "[T]he party suffering this instruction will be
hard-pressed to prevail on the merits."" The Zubulake IV court referred to the
adverse inference charge as an "extreme" sanction.
D. TraditionalApplication ofthe Adverse Inference Instruction
A seminal case on adverse inference instructions in the Fourth Circuit is
Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp.76 In that case, Vodusek's expert witness, Mr.
Halsey, had examined evidence, namely a boat, in an attempt to discover the
cause of an explosion and fire.
The district court found that the expert
participated in the spoliation of relevant evidence by employing destructive
means in his examination of the boat that rendered it useless for subsequent
examination by the defendants and their experts.78 The court submitted to the
jury the question of whether the witness engaged in spoliation, stating in part:
If you find in this case the plaintiff s counsel and agents, including
Mr. Halsey, failed to fulfill th[e] duty [to preserve relevant evidence],
then you . .. are permitted to, if you feel justified in doing so, assume
that evidence made unavailable to the defendants by acts of plaintiff's
counsel or agents, including Mr. Halsey, would have been unfavorable
to the plaintiff s theory in the case.79
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court acted within its
discretion by permitting the jury to draw an adverse inference if the jury found
that Vodusek (through her agent, Mr. Halsey) was responsible for the loss or
destruction of evidence. 0 In reaching this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit noted
that district courts have discretion to invoke a wide range of responses to the loss
or destruction of evidence.81 An adverse inference instruction may be imposed
even in the absence of a finding of bad faith, so long as evidence was lost or
destroyed and "the party knew the evidence was relevant to some issue at trial

73. 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
74. Id. at 219, 220.
75. Id. (noting that "ain adverse inference instruction often ends litigation"); see also Rimnkus,
688 F. Supp. 2d at 618-19 ("Although adverse inference instructions can take varying forms that
range in harshness, and although all such instructions are less harsh than so-called terminating
sanctions, they are properly viewed as among the most severe sanctions a court can administer.");
Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 100, 101 (D. Md. 2003) (stating
that adverse inference sanctions are "extreme" and "not to be given lightly").
76. 71 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 1995).
77. See id. at 155.
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 157.
81. See id. at 156.
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and that his willful conduct resulted in its loss or destruction."2 But when an
adverse inference instruction is given, the "varty's failure to produce evidence
may, of course, be explained satisfactorily."
In upholding the district court's
approach, the Fourth Circuit concluded, "[r]ather than deciding the spoliation
issue itself, the district court provided the jury with appropriate guidelines for
evaluating the evidence." 84
While subsequent courts have taken divergent approaches from the jury
instruction given in Vodlusek, it remains a leading case on spoliation and
adverse inference charges in the Fourth Circuit.8 Thus, courts continue to
permit the parties to present anew all spoliation issues before a jury, even after a
court has already found that a party committed sanctionable spoliation. To
illustrate, in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V), Judge Scheindlin
gave the following instruction:
If you find that UBS could have produced this evidence, and that
the evidence was within its control, and that the evidence would have
been material in deciding facts in dispute in this case, you are permitted,
but not required, to infer that the evidence would have been unfavorable
to UBS."
With the above principles in mind, the authors will now turn to an
application of an adverse inference instruction in a case involving e-discovery
and loss of ESI-Nucor Corp. v. Bell.
111.

NUCOR CORP. v. BELL: IMPOSITION OF A PERMISSIVE
INSTRUCTION AFTER A JUDICIAL FINDING OF ESI SPOLIATION

INFERENCE

In Nucor Corp. v. Bell,89 the plaintiff steel corporation sued its former
employee, John Bell, and Bell's new employer, SeverCorr, LLC. 90 Bell had

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 157.
85. See, e.g., Aaron v. Kroger Ltd. P'ship I, No. 2:10cv606, 2012 WL 78392, at *3 (E.D. Va.
Jan. 6, 2012) ("[O]n the spoliation issue, there is nothing left for the jury to decide.... [T]o allow
Defendant to rebut the instruction would essentially render futile this Court's prior judgment that
Defendant's conduct warranted sanction."); Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan
v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456. 496 n1.251 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding it "important
to explain that the jury is bound by the Court's determination that certain plaintiffs destroyed
documents after the duty to preserve arose"), abrogated by Chin v. Port Auth., 685 F.3d 135 (2d
Cir. 2012).
86. See Trigon Ins. Co. v. United States. 204 F.R.D. 277. 286 (E.D. Va. 2001) ("The leading
authority in the Fourth Circuit respecting spoliation is Vodusek . ...
87. 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
88. Id. at 440.
89. 251 F.R.D. 191 (D.S.C. 2008).
90. See id. at 193.
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worked in Nucor's steel mills for nineteen years, rising to the position of General
Manager of Steelmaking Technologies. 91 During his tenure at Nucor, Bell "was
intimately involved in the development of processes for manufacturing
Interstitial-Free/Ultra Low Carbon (IF/ULC) steel," a high-end product used in
automotive manufacturing.92 Nucor contended that it was the only steelmaker
with the ability to manufacture IF/ULC steel from scrap metal.
When Bell left
Nucor in March 2006 to become SeverCorr's Executive Vice President and
General Manager of Operations, Nucor sued both Bell and SeverCorr for
misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of contract, unfair trade practices, and
other related claims.94 At the root of the lawsuit was the accusation that Bell and
SeverCorr misappropriated Nucor's trade secrets-specifically, Nucor's
processes for creating IF/ULC steel-and improperly solicited Nucor
employees.
Nucor filed its complaint in South Carolina state court on October 6. 2006.96
"On October 11, 2006, the state court issued a preservation order that, [among
other things], prohibited [the] defendants from destroying or altering any
electronic documents."97 The defendants removed the action to the United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina six days later. 98
On May 24, 2007, Nucor moved for sanctions on the basis of the defendants'
alleged spoliation of electronic evidence.99 Nucor alleged that the defendants
negligently or intentionally destroyed evidence that had been contained on a
SanDisk USB drive that Bell discarded and on a la0top computer that Bell used
while working for his new employer, SeverCorr.
Nucor requested that the
court sanction the defendants by entering judgment against them or, in the
alternative, giving the jury an adverse inference instruction at trial.
Nucor alleged that the missing SanDisk USB drive contained trade secrets
relating to Nucor's processes for making IF/ULC steel. 102 Nucor had good
reason to believe that Bell may have misappropriated trade secrets: Bell admitted
that he had downloaded information on Nucor's IF/ULC production processes to
the USB drive from his Nucor computer and that he later viewed some of the
information on the USB drive on his SeverCorr laptop.103 The evidence showed

91. See id.
92. Id.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See
See
See
See
Id.

id.
id.
id.
id.

98. See id.
99. Plaintiff Nucor's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Sanctions at 1, 25, Nucor Corp.,
251 F.R.D. 191 (No. 2:06-cv-02972-DCN), 2007 WL 5189395.
100. See Nucor Corp., 251 F.R.D. at 193.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 195.
103. See id.
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that the USB drive had. at various times, been "connected to Bell's Nucor work
computer, his home computer, and his SeverCorr laptop, making it a possible
vehicle for the transfer of confidential files and documents."1 04 Bell further
conceded that he threw away the USB drive because he knew that Nucor was
"very litigious," because "things were starting to heat up" 105 with Nucor, and
because he "'was concerned that [Nucor] would make an issue' of the device."
In its ruling, the court explained that Bell had a duty to preserve the USB
drive at the time he threw it away because "a party has a duty to preserve
evidence during litigation and at any time 'before the litigation when a party
reasonably should know that the evidence may be relevant to anticipated
litigation.", 107 Bell admitted that he threw away the USB drive precisely
because he was concerned about litigation.108 The court therefore found that Bell
destroyed the USB drive (i.e., spoliated evidence) intentionally and in bad
faith.1 9
The destruction of electronic files on Bell's SeverCorr laptop presented a
thornier issue to the court. Bell used the laptop as his primary work computer
from the time he began working at SeverCorr until late October 2006, when the
laptop's hard drive was delivered to his lawyers. 110 Nucor contended that both
Bell and SeverCorr:
spoliated data on Bell's SeverCorr laptop in three ways: (1) intentionally
using the laptop computer after this litigation began, thereby causing the
loss of relevant data, (2) intentionally deleting and overwriting relevant
data with zeros, and (3) their expert's attempt to create additional
forensic copies of the laptop hard drive, which led to its failure.I
In support of its argument, Nucor presented the testimony of computer forensics
expert John Jorgensen, who testified that the defendants had destroyed evidence
through Bell's continued use of the laptop.112
After conducting seven hearings on the spoliation issues, the court found
that the defendants had spoliated electronic evidence contained on the laptop

104. Id.
105. Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. Id. (alteration in original).
107. Id. (quoting Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001)).
108. See id. In addition to Bell's testimony as to why he threw the USB drive away, the
evidence also showed that Nucor had warned Bell that it would take "appropriate' action" if Bell
failed to honor his confidentiality agreement with Nucor. See id. In April 2006, Bell informed
SeverCorr's human resources director that he was concerned that Nucor might sue him. See id.
109. See id at 196.
110. Id at 197.
111. Id. at 196.
112. See id. at 193 94.
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through Bell's continued use of the computer after litigation commenced.'
The
court began by reciting the standard in the Fourth Circuit for proving spoliation:
First, the altered or destroyed evidence must have been relevant to the
litigation. Second, the party must have been under a duty to preserve
the evidence at the time it was altered or destroyed.... Finally, the
spoliating party must have acted with the requisite level of intent, which
varies depending on the sanction imposed. When dealing with adverse
inference charges, the sanction is only appropriate if the spoliator's
"willful conduct resulted in [the evidence's] loss or destruction."
At the first step in its spoliation analysis, the court determined that the data
on the laptop was relevant to the litigation:
Bell used the laptop as his primary work computer from the time he
started at SeverCorr until the hard drive was delivered to his lawyers in
late October 2006. There can be little doubt that the data on Bell's
SeverCorr laptop is relevant in a case involving, among other causes of
action, misappropriation of trade secrets and computer fraud and abuse.
The presence of confidential Nucor information on the laptop would
tend to make it more probable that defendants misappropriated Nucor's
trade secrets; the absence of confidential Nucor information would make
it less probable. Analysis of the data on the laptop has shown that
several USB thumb-drive devices with Nucor-related documents were
connected to the laptop, and that Bell used the laptop to view Nucor
documents. All of that information is relevant in this case.
Second, the court found that the defendants had anticipated, or should have
reasonably anticipated, litigation that would have triggered a duty to preserve
electronic evidence.1 6 Nucor filed its lawsuit in state court on October 6, 2006,
and that court entered an evidence preservation order on October 11. 2006.1
The preservation order stated: "Defendants and all persons with notice are
hereby prohibited from destroy[ing], removing, transferring, or altering any
documents, whether in hard copy or computer format (disc or hard-drive or
otherwise) requested by the attached request for production of documents or

113. See id. at 197. The court found that Nucor had failed to prove that the defendants either
intentionally deleted or overwvrote data or that the defendants' computer forensics expert had
destroyed data during his attempts to analyze the laptop's hard drive. See id. at 199 200.
114. Id. at 194 (citations omitted) (quoting Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148,
156 (4th Cir. 1995)).
115. Id. at 197.
116. See id.
117. See id.
at 193.
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otherwise discoverable in this action inder Rule 26."118 The attached request for
production specifically included '"[a]ll documents, including computer files,
legacy data sets from previous computer environments, and data, concerning
Nucor in the possession, custody or control of Bell' along with other documents
that may be found on a work computer." 119 Nucor served the preservation order
on the defendants on October 13, 2006.120 The evidence showed that the
defendants anticipated litigation even well in advance of the October 2006
timeframe: as early as April 2006, Bell informed a member of the SeverCorr
management team that he thought that Nucor might sue him.121
At the third step of the analysis, the court held that the defendants had
destroyed electronic evidence through Bell's continued use of his SeverCorr
computer for work purposes.122 The court explained that the defendants had
destroyed evidence in at least three ways: (1) by destroying items marked as
unallocated space. (2) by displacing the operating system's event logs, and (3) by
generating new restore points. 1 ' First, Bell's continued use of the computer
destroyed items marked as unallocated space.12 4 When a person deletes a file
from his or her hard drive, that file is not simply erased. 1
Instead, the file
126
remains on the hard drive but is marked as unallocated space.
Once the file is
so marked, the computer will overwrite the file with new data as needed.12
When a file is overwritten with new data, it is permanently lost and cannot be
recovered.128 Thus, a deleted file remains recoverable from the time it is marked
for deletion until it is overwritten with new data.
Computer forensics experts

118. Id at 197 (quoting Plaintiff Nucor's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Sanctions,
supra note 99, at 5).
119. Id. (alteration in original).
120. Id. (citing Plaintiff Nucor's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Sanctions, supra note
99, at 5).
121. See id at 195.
122. See id. at 199.
123. See id at 198.
124. See id
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id
128. See id
129. See id. One commentator has explained this process as it applies to Microsoft Windows:
1-ow is [it] that deleting a file doesn't, well. delete it? The answer lies in how
Windows stores and catalogues files. Remember that the Windows files system deposits
files at various locations on your disc drive and then keeps track of where it has tucked
those files away in its File Allocation Table or Master File Table-essentially a table of
contents for the massive tome of data on your drive. This table keeps tabs on what parts
of the hard drive contain files and what parts are available for storing new data. When
you delete a file, Windows doesn't scurry around the hard drive vacuuming up ones and
zeroes. Instead, all it does is add a special hexadecimal character (E5h) to replace the
first letter of the filename in FAT systems or add an entry to the master file table in NTFS
that tells the system "this file has been deleted" and, by so doing, makes the disk space
containing the deleted data available for storage of new data (called "unallocated
space"). But deciding that a file drawer can be used for new stuff and clearing out the
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for both parties agreed that "data in unallocated space is lost every time a
computer is turned on or shut down, when a program is installed or de-installed.
when a user runs a program, or virtually any time anything happens on a
computer."'13 0 The court determined that it was inevitable that "a substantial
amount of data in unallocated space was lost because defendants continued to
use the computer while under a duty to preserve evidence."13
Second, Bell's continued use of the SeverCorr laptop led to the displacement
of a number of operating system event logs.132 The Windows XP operating
system that was loaded on Bell's computer maintained logs that recorded, among
other things, the programs run on the system, the actions taken on the system,
and network connections made by the system. 13 Event logs contain a finite
number of events. 13
As a user operates his or her computer, new entries
displace the oldest entries.
The continued use of Bell's SeverCorr laptop
caused the loss of over 1,564 event log entries from October 10, 2006, the day
before the state court issued its data preservation order, to October 18, 2006, the
day defendants stopped using the laptop.16 Additionally, Bell's continued use
of his work laptop led to the loss of several "restore points."
Approximately
twelve restore points were lost as a result of the defendants' use of the SeverCorr
laptop after October 10, 2006. 3 "Those lost restore points represent[ed] 447
megabytes of lost or missing data" that could not be recovered.
At the final step of its analysis, the court determined that the defendants had
acted with the requisite level of culpability.
The court stated:
It would strain credulity to believe that defendants did not know the
laptop would contain relevant evidence in this litigation. As Bell's

old stuff are two very different things. The old stuff-the deleted data-stays on the
drive until it is magnetically overwritten by new data ....
Craig D. Ball, Nerdy Things Laivers Should Know About Electronic Evidence, ALI-ABA
Continuing Prof. Educ., Westlaw VCU0712 ALI-ABA 1. 109 (2012).
130. Nucor, 251 F.R.D. at 198.
131. Id. For example, the defendants' repeated installation and de-installation of the eScan
anti-virus program led to the overwriting of 73.3 megabytes of data marked as unallocated space.
See id. (citation omitted).
132. See id. (citation omitted).

133. Id.
134. See id. (explaining how new entries in an event log displace old entries).
135. Id.
136. See id. (citation omitted).
137. See id. Windows XP contains a feature called System Restore that allows users to return
their operating system to its configuration at an earlier time. See How to Set a System Restore Point
on Windows XP, MICROSOFT SUPPORT, http://support.nicrosoft.com/kb/948247 (last visited Feb. 4,
2013). If something is amiss with a computer, the user may opt to restore the system to an earlier
point at which the computer was working. See id. Microsoft XP "automatically creates system
restore points every day." Id.
138. Nucor, 251 F.R.D. at 198.
139. Id. (citation omitted).
140. See id. at 198 99.
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primary work computer, the laptop would certainly contain information
about Bell's activities at SeverCorr, his development of processes for
SeverCorr, his communications with Nucor and SeverCorr employees,
and other potentially relevant documents.141
Ultimately, the court found that both Bell and SeverCorr were liable for the
spoliation of electronic evidence that had been contained on the laptop. 1
While the court determined that the extreme sanction of imposing default
judgment was unwarranted, 14 it held that an adverse inference charge was
proper. 144 The court noted an "inconsistency in how courts deal with the
division of fact-finding labor" when imposing an adverse inference charge,145 as
it is repetitive for a court to find that spoliation occurred and then allow the jury

to decide that issue anew.146 Nevertheless, the court relied on precedent and
allowed the parties to present all spoliation issues to the jury for their
consideration.
It was ordered that the following charge be given at trial:
If you find that defendants engaged in the spoliation of evidence,
you are permitted, but not required, to infer that the altered or destroyed
evidence would have been unfavorable to defendants. Any inference
you decide to draw should be based on all the facts and circumstances in
this case.
IV. SUBSEQUENT APPLICATION OF THE ADVERSE INFERENCE INSTRUCTION

Following the Nucor Corp. v. Bell decision in 2008, courts have taken
divergent approaches regarding the appropriate division of fact-finding labor
when deciding to impose an adverse inference instruction. Two decisions issued
in 2010-Pension Committee of the University of Aontreal Pension Plan v.
Banc of America Securities, LLC 149 and Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. v.
Cammaratal -best
embody the separate camps. Two even more recent
decisions issued by the same court within the Fourth Circuit, the Eastern District

141. Id. at 199.
142. See id. ("The court therefore concludes that defendants engaged in spoliation by
continuing to use the Bell SeverCorr laptop when they were under a duty to preserve the data on its
hard drive.").

143. Id. at 201.
144. See id. at 202.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 203.
147. See id. (citing Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148. 155-57 (4th Cir. 1995);
Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422, 439-40 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
148. Id. at 204.
149. 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 496 n.251 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (telling the jury to presume bad faith),
abrogatedby Chin v. Port Auth., 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012).
150. 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 644, 646 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (giving the jury discretion to decide if
defendants acted in bad faith).
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of Virginia,
and another by the Northern District of California,
in an
ongoing blockbuster e-discovery dispute, show that the adverse inference
instruction continues to be formulated and applied on a case-by-case basis.
A. Pension Committee and Rimkus
First, in Pension Committee-a decision that Judge Scheindlin titled
"Zubulake Revisited: Six Years Later"
-after finding that sanctionable
spoliation had occurred, the court gave an adverse inference instruction that
informed the jury that the plaintiffs breached their duty to preserve evidence.14
The court defined various "forms" of adverse inference instructions "ranging in
degrees of harshness."155 At the most severe end of the spectrum is spoliation
that results from bad faith.
In that case, "a jury can be instructed that certain
facts are deemed admitted and must be accepted as true."
In the middle of the
spectrum, "a court may impose a [rebuttable] mandatory presumption" when a
party has acted "willfully or recklessly."1
Finally, at the lowest end of the
spectrum, a "spoliation charge" is simply an instruction that "allows the jury to
consider both the misconduct of the spoliating party as well as proof of prejudice
to the innocent party." 159
Judge Scheindlin determined that certain of the plaintiffs in Pension
Committee were grossly negligent.160 As a punishment, the court decided to give
what it called a mandatory instruction, which is subject to rebuttall
I instruct you, as a matter of law, that each of these plaintiffs failed
to preserve evidence after its duty to preserve arose. This failure
resulted from their gross negligence in performing their discovery
obligations. As a result, you may presume, if you so choose, that such
lost evidence was relevant, and that it would have been favorable to the
Citco Defendants. In deciding whether to adopt this presumption, you
may take into account the egregiousness of the plaintiffs' conduct in
failing to preserve the evidence.

151. Aaron v. Kroger Ltd. P'ship I, No. 2:10cy606, 2012 WL 78392 (E.D. Va. Jan. 6, 2012);
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus.. Inc.. 803 F. Supp. 2d 469 (E.D. Va. 2011).
152. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. C 11-1846 LH-K (PSG), 2012 WL 3042943 (N.D.
Cal. July 25, 2012).
153. Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 461 (citing Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y.
2004); Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
154. See id. at 496-97.
155. Id. at 470.
156. See id.

157. Id.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id. at 470-71.
See id. at 479.
See id. at 470.
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However, each of these plaintiffs has offered evidence that (1) no
evidence was lost; (2) if evidence was lost, it was not relevant; and (3) if
evidence was lost and it was relevant, it would not have been favorable
to the Citco Defendants.
If you decline to presume that the lost evidence was relevant or
would have been favorable to the Citco Defendants, then your
consideration of the lost evidence is at an end, and you will not draw
any inference arising from the lost evidence.
However, if you decide to presume that the lost evidence was
relevant and would have been favorable to the Citco Defendants, you
must next decide whether any of the ... plaintiffs have rebutted that
presumption . . . . If you determine that a plaintiff has rebutted the

presumption that the lost evidence was either relevant or favorable to the
Citco Defendants, you will not draw any inference arising from the lost
evidence against that plaintiff. If, on the other hand, you determine that
a plaintiff has not rebutted the presumption that the lost evidence was
both relevant and favorable to the Citco Defendants, you may draw an
inference against that plaintiff and in favor of the Citco Defendantsnamely that the lost evidence would have been favorable to the Citco
Defendants. 162
In drafting this instruction, the court found it "important to explain that the
jury is bound by the Court's determination that certain plaintiffs destroyed
documents after the duty to preserve arose," 63 but decided not to instruct that the
lost evidence was relevant or caused harm to the defendants.164 As to the first
point, the Pension Committee instruction differs from that given in Zubulake V,
in which the jury was given the ability to decide whether the duty to preserve
was met. 65 Thus, Pension Committee appears to be one of the first incarnations
of a divergence from the Vodusek/Zubulake V/Nucor approaches that allow the
jury to presume relevance and prejudice ifit finds spoliation. With respect to the
second point, while the Pension Committee court departed from the framework
of earlier decisions by instructing the jury that spoliation had occurred, the court
held strong to the view that the jury must make the determination of relevance
and prejudice, as "[s]uch a finding is within the province of the jury not the
court. 166
On the other hand, the court in Rimkus reverted back to the permissive "if
you find spoliation" jury instruction. 167 It found that the defendants had engaged

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
2010).

Id. at 496-97.
Id. at 496 n.251.
See id.
See Zubulake 1".229 F.R.D. 422, 439-40 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 496 n1.251.
See Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 608 (S.D. Tex.
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in "intentional destruction of emails and other electronic information at a time
when they were known to be relevant to anticipated or pending litigation." 168
The court decided to instruct the jury that the defendants had a duty to preserve
ESL16 9 However, unlike in Pension Committee, "Judge Rosenthal craft[ed] a
jury instruction that [gave] the jury the discretion to decide whether the
defendants acted in bad faith and, even if they did, whether to draw adverse
inferences." 170
Neither the Rinkus nor Pension Committee courts mentioned the Nucor
court's discussion regarding the "inconsistency in how courts deal with the
division of fact-finding labor."1
Nevertheless, courts closer to home have
taken notice. Two recent decisions out of the Eastern District of Virginia-a
district that, like the court that issued Nucor. falls within the Fourth Circuittook varying approaches to the formulation of adverse inference instructions,
with both courts mentioning Nucor1 72 but one finding the defendant's reliance on
,173
its approach to be "misplaced."
B.

Cases Decided in the Fourth Circuit

First, consider E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Industries,Inc.,174 in
which the district court found that the defendant had deleted some ESI. 175 While
some electronic evidence was ultimately recovered, the court nevertheless
determined that the information was still "spoliated" since deletion altered the
evidence, and the alteration of evidence constitutes spoliation.
The court
ultimatey decided that the defendant had engaged in the "intentional and bad
faith deletion of relevant files and email items by key employees."
All that

168. Id. at 607; see id. at 653.
169. See id. at 626.
170. Rimkus v. Cammarata: Zubulake Revisited Agai, 10 Digital Discovery & E-Evidence

Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 2 (Mar. 1. 2010) (citing Rimkus Consulting Grp., 688 F. Supp. 2d at 626)
("This approach differs from that taken by Judge Scheindlin in Pension Committee, where Judge
[Scheindlin] issued a jury instruction requiring the jury to accept the court's finding that the
plaintiffs were grossly negligent in performing their discovery obligations and directing the jury that
it could presune that the evidence that had been lost was relevant to the case and prejudicial to the
plaintiffs, unless the jury were to find that the plaintiffs had rebutted that presumption with evidence
at trial." (citing Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 470)).
171. Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191. 202 (D.S.C. 2008).
172. Aaron v. Kroger Ltd. P'ship I, No. 2:10cy606, 2012 WL 78392, at *2 3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 6,
2012) (citing Nucor, 251 F.R.D. at 192 93, 203-04) (discussing the Nucor decision); E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus.. Inc.. 803 F. Supp. 2d 469, 507 (E.D. Va. 2011) (citing Nucor,
251 F.R.D. at 196, 197-99) (same).
173. See Aaron, 2012 WL 78392, at *2.
174. 803 F. Supp. 2d 469.

175. See id. at 501.
176. See id. at 506 ("The fact that technology permits the undoing of spoliation does not
change at all the fact that spoliation has occurred even as to the recovered information.").
177. Id. at 507.
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remained was to choose the appropriate sanction.
Pension Committee-like adverse inference instruction:

The court settled on a

480

Having found both bad faith and intentional deletion of relevant
materials, the Court will inform the jury that certain Kolon executives
and employees, after learning that DuPont had sued Kolon, deleted
much electronically stored information that would have been available
to DuPont for use in presenting its case. The jury then should be
allowed to infer that the unrecoverable deleted information would be
helpful to DuPont and harmful to Kolon. The jury also should be told
that the fact of deletion, without regard to whether the deleted material
was recovered, may be taken into account in assessing the element of
Kolon's intent and knowledge.179
Kolon Industries was quickly followed by Aaron v. Kroger Limited
PartnersihipI,o authored by a different judge sitting in the Eastern District of
Virginia. 8 1 The 4aron court explicitly decided to "administer an adverse
inference instruction [such that] Defendant may not introduce evidence at trial on
the spoliation issue to rebut the adverse inference." 8 The procedural posture of
this decision is important because it likely impacted the court's decision on how
to implement the jury instruction. The court had already decided in a previous
order that an adverse inference instruction was appropriate based on the
defendant's willful and deliberate destruction of video footage from the day of
the slip-and-fall incident that formed the basis of the plaintiffs complaint.1
The plaintiff, who initially raised the issue of defendant's spoliation, then filed a
motion in limine seeking clarification on how the instruction would be
phrased. 184
The court granted the plaintiffs motion in limine and clarified that the
defendant would not be pernitted at trial to "litigate the spoliation issue anew
and to allow the jury to substitute its own judgment in place of that already
entered by th[e] Court."1
In strong language, the court stated: "The factfinding necessary to resolve the spoliation issue has ... already occurred,
thereby obviating any role for the jury on this matter." s8 The court continued:
"Contrary to Defendant's apparent wishes, the jury's function is not to serve as

178. See id.
179. Id. at 509; see also Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of
Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 496-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (providing the comparison jury
charge), abrogatedby Chin v. Port Auth.. 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012).
180. No. 2:10cv606. 2012 WL 78392 (E.D. Va. Jan. 6. 2012).
181. See Aaron, 2012 WL 78392, at * 1; Kolon Indus., 803 F. Supp. 2d at 474.
182. Aaron, 2012 WL 78392, at *1.
183. Aaron v. Kroger Ltd. P'ship 1. No. 2: 10cv606 (E.D. Va. Sept. 27. 2011).
184. Aaron, 2012 WL 78392, at *1.
185. Id. at *2.
186. Id. (emphasis added).
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an appellate tribunal for this Court's decisions."187 What's more, the court found
the defendant's reliance on the approach taken in Nucor to be "misplaced"
because "[a]though Nucor suggests that this Court could nonetheless allow the
jury to reconsider whether Defendant's conduct warrants an adverse inference
instruction, it does not-nor does any other case-mandate such a result."
C. Imposition of an Adverse Inference Instruction in Recent Litigation:
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co.
The issues discussed tip to this point in the Article have been playing out in
the "tech trial of the centurv" 8 between two electronics manufacturing giants:
Apple Inc. (Apple) and Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. (Samsung). 90 On April
15, 2011, Apple filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California., alleging that several of Samsun s Android-line
products infringed on existing Apple patents and trademarks.
Since then,
lawsuits between the two companies have sprung up all over the world.192 The
judge for the Northern District of California case calendared the trial to begin on
July 30, 2012.'
Prior to trial, Apple brought a motion for issuance of an
adverse inference jury instruction against Samsung.194
In a prior, unrelated case, M1osaid Technologies Inc. v. Samsung Electronics
Co.,195 the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey sanctioned
Samsung with an adverse inference instruction for spoliation, finding that the
"rolling basis" by which Samsung's emails were deleted, even when litigation

187. Id.
188. Id at *2 3 (citing Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 203-04 (D.S.C. 2008)). A
decision issued in July 2012 disagreed with the Aaron approach. See Am. Builders & Contractors
Supply Co. v. Roofers Mart, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-19 (CEJ), 2012 WL 2992627, at *6 (E.D. Mo. July
20, 2012) (stating that although the spoliating party would not be permitted "'a complete retrial of
the sanctions [determination] during trial."' it would be permitted to offer evidence showing that the
missing information was not favorable to plaintiff. "which necessarily includes evidence that the
destruction was innocent" (quoting Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 354 F.3d 739, 750 (8th Cir.
2003))).
189. Jeff John Roberts, 3 Reasons Juries Have No Place in the PatentSystem, GIGAOM (Aug.
25, 2012, 4:11 PM), http://gigaom.con/2012/08/27/ 3 -reasons-juries-have-no-place-in-the-patentsystem/.
190. See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. Cl 1-1846 LHK (PSG), 2012 WL 3042943
(N.D. Cal. July 25, 2012).
191. See id. at *5.
192. See generally Mariko Yasu & Naoko Fujimura, Apple Loses Patent Lawsuit Against
Samsung in Japan, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 31, 2012. 1:16 PM), http://www.bloomberg.cominews!
2012-08-31/apple-loses-japan-patent-lawsuit-against-samsung-over-devices.html
(describing the
outcome of a suit between Apple and Samsung in Japan as "the latest decision in [the] global
dispute between the technology giants over patents used in mobile devices").
193. Minute Order and Case Management Order at 2. Apple Inc., 2012 WL 3042943 (No. 11CV-01846-LIK).
194. See Apple Inc., 2012 WL 3042943, at *1.
195. Mosaid Techs. Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D.N.J. 2004).
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was anticipated or ongoing, resulted in the destruction of relevant emails. 196 The
same auto-delete function was at issue in Apple v. Samsung. 197 The "mySingle"
system, developed by a Samsung subsidiary, calls for all emails to be
automatically deleted every two weeks, although employees have the option of
saving emails to their computer's hard drive. 198 In Mosaid, the auto-delete
function was not turned off when litigation was anticipated and then ongoing.199
In Apple, the same problem occurred, but as the court stated: "Rather than
building itself an off-switch-and using it-in future litigation such as this one,
Samsung appears to have adopted the alternative approach of 'mend it don't end
it. "'20

The motion for an adverse inference instruction went to the magistrate
judge, who decided that Sansung owed a duty to preserve as of August 4, 2010,
when Apple gave Samsung "more than just a vague hint that it believed
Sarnsung had violated its intellectual property," and Samsung sent litigation hold
notices to some of its employees.20 1 The court next found that Samsung failed to
disable the mySingle system's biweekly email destruction policy and willfully
and consciously disregarded its duty to verify whether its employees were
actually complying with the litigation holds.
Finally, the magistrate judge
found that most emails relevant to the litigation were subject to the biweekly
destruction policy.203
In crafting the sanction of an adverse inference instruction, the magistrate
judge noted the "dilemma" in formulating the proper charge. 204 Relying on
Pension Committee, the magistrate judge decided that the following instruction
would be most appropriate:
Samsung has failed to prevent the destruction of relevant evidence
for Apple's use in this litigation. This is known as the "spoliation of
evidence."
I instruct you, as a matter of law, that Samsung failed to preserve
evidence after its duty to preserve arose. This failure resulted from its
failure to perform its discovery obligations.
You also may presume that Apple has met its burden of proving the
following two elements by a preponderance of the evidence: first, that
relevant evidence was destroyed after the duty to preserve arose.
Evidence is relevant if it would have clarified a fact at issue in the trial

196. See id. at 333, 339-40.
197. See Apple Ic., 2012 WL 3042943, at *I (citing Mosaid Techs., 348 F. Supp. 2d at 333,

339).
198. See id at *3.
199. See Mosaid Techs., 348 F. Supp. 2d at 333.
200. Apple Ic., 2012 WL 3042943, at *1.
201. Id at *5 (citation omitted).
202. See id at *6.
203. See id. at *7.
204. See id.
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and otherwise would naturally have been introduced into evidence; and
second, the lost evidence was favorable to Apple.
Whether this finding is important to you in reaching a verdict in this
case is for you to decide. You may choose to find it determinative,
somewhat determinative, or not at all determinative in reaching your
verdict. 20
Samsung subsequently challenged the magistrate judge's decision in the
district court.206 The district court found that the magistrate judge's findings
regarding spoliation were not "clearly erroneous.2 07 However, the district court
disagreed with the "propriety of the precise sanction imposed, 2 08 stating that,
"[T]he Court does not find that such a strong adverse inference instruction is
justified by this record."209
In the Ninth Circuit, courts must choose "the least onerous sanction
corresponding to the willfulness of the destructive act and the prejudice suffered
by the victim." 2 10 The district court found mitigating evidence, for example, that
"Samsung produced over 12 million pages of documents, including over 80,000
emails, gathered from more than 380 witnesses," and that Apple was able to
depose a "substantial number of the key Samsung witnesses whose emails Apple
suspects may not have been preserved." " As such, the district court found the
following watered-down charge more appropriate: "Samsung Electronics
Company has failed to preserve evidence for Apple's use in this litigation after
its duty to preserve arose. Whether this fact is important to you in reaching a
verdict in this case is for you to decide."
Ultimately, the district court found that Apple also failed in its data
preservation duties and ordered that the same adverse inference instruction be
imposed against Apple. 2 Since these instructions "effectively [cancelled] each

205. Id at *8.
206. See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LITK, 2012 WL 362773 1 at *1
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2012).
207. Id at *10.
208. Id at *12.
209. Id. at *13.
210. Id. at *12 (quoting Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1994))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
211. Id at *14 (citing Declaration of Alex Binder in Support of Samsung's Opposition to
Apple Inc.'s Motion for Adverse Inference Jury Instruction at 1, Apple Inc., 2012 WL 3627731 (No.
I 1-CV-01846-LHK)).
212. Id at *15.
213. See id. at *19. The magistrate judge had denied a motion for an adverse inference
instruction brought by Samsung as untimely. See id. at *15. The district court reversed this
determination. See id. It additionally determined that Apple's duty to preserve arose in August
2010 but that it did not issue litigation hold notices until after filing its complaint in April 2011. See
id. "During that time, not only were employees given no affirmative instructions to preserv e
potentially relevant documents, but some employees may have been encouraged to keep the size of
their email accounts below certain limits, and moreover ma' have received automatic notices
requesting that they reduce the size of their email accounts." Id. at *17. The court granted an
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other out[, a]t the request of the parties, the judge agreed not to give the dueling
instructions to the jury."214 At trial, the jury found that Samsung had infringed
on certain Apple iPhone-related patents and awarded Apple $1,049,343,540 in
damages. 2
The verdict was challenged,216 and in late February 2013, the
district judge reduced the damage award by more than 40% and ordered a new
trial to recalculate a portion of those damages.'
Much controversy has centered on the verdict, for several reasons.218 For
one, the jurors reached a verdict in only twenty-two hours,) quickly enough
that "one of Apple's lawyers was so surprised and unprepared that he had to rush
back to court without a suit, and showed up in a polo shirt." 220 Another problem
is the jurors' possible disregard of the district court's jury instructions, which, in
fairness to the jurors, totaled 109 pages.221 The instructions stated in part:
The amount of those damages must be adequate to compensate the
patent holder for the infringement. A damages award should put the
patent holder in approximately the financial position it would have been
in had the infringement not occurred, but in no event may the damages
award be less than a reasonable royalty. You should keep in mind that

adverse inference instruction against Apple even though "Apple does not employ an automatic email destruction policy like [Samsung's] mySingle" system. Id.
214. Michael Kozubek, Dueling Deletions, INSIDE COUNSEL, Nov. 2012, at 40, available at
http://www.iisidecouinsel.com2012/10/30/apple-samsung-narrowly-escape-adverse-inference-in?t=ediscovery.
215. See generally Jury in Apple v. Samsung Goofed, Damages Reduced Uh Oh. What's
Wrong iwith this Picture?, GROKLAW (Aug. 25, 2012, 11:30 AM), http://groklaw.net/article.php?
story=2012082510525390 (discussing the jury's verdict and the damages award).
216. See Samsung's Notice of Motion and Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, New
Trial and/or Remittur Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50 and 59, Apple Inc., 2012 WL
3627731 (No. 11-CV-01846-LHK).
217. See Joel Rosenblatt, Apple Objects to Second Samsung Patent Lawosuit Delay,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 8. 2013. 12:01 AM), lsttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-08/appleobjects-to-second-samsung-patent-lawsuit-being-paused-1-.html; Nick Wingfield, Judge Cuts Sum
Owed to Apple over Patents, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Mar. 1, 2013, 4:01 PM), http://bits.
blogs.nytimes.coni2013/03/01/judge-slashes-jury-award-in-apple-samsung-case/.
218. See, e.g., Mike Masnick, Apple/Sanisung Jurors Admit They Finished Quickly by
Ignoring Prior Art & Other key Factors, TECHDIRT (Aug. 27, 2012. 9:30 AM), http:/
www.techdirt.com/airtices/20120826/23534320161/applesamsung-jurors-adnit-they -finished-quicldyignoring-prior-art-other-key -factors.slhtml (discussing how jurors may have ignored important
information); Jurv in Apple v. Samsung Gootfed, Damages Reduced -h
Oh. What's Wrong With
this Picture?, supra note 215 (questioning the soundness of the jury's verdict).
219. See Jessica E. Vascellaro, Apple Wins Big in Patent Case, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25-26,
2012. at A8.
220. Masnick, supra note 218.
221. The jury also had to contend with a 700-question verdict form. See Final Jury
Instructions, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Flees. Co., No. 11-CV-01846-L1K. 2012 WL 3627731 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 21, 2012) (No. 11-CV-01846-LH-1K); Masnick, supra note 218 (explaining how jury's
short deliberation caused some to question whether the jury actually listened to the judge's
instruction).
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the dainages you award are meant to compensate the patent holder and
not to punish an inftinger.222
In an interview following the trial, the jury foreman, who was a patent
holder himself, m said, "We didn't want to give carte blanche to a company, by
any name, to infringe someone else's intellectual property."224 "We wanted to
make sure the message we sent was not just a slap on the wrist .... We wanted
to make sure it was sufficiently high to be painful, but not unreasonable."m
D. Summary
The following table summarizes the type of adverse inference instruction
imposed in the foregoing cases based on the level of culpability the court found
and whether the jury was given the discretion to decide anew the spoliation issue
and to make the relevance/prej idice determinations:

222. Final Jury Instructions, supra note 221, at 49 (emphasis added).
223. See Jury in Apple v. Samsung Goofed, Damages Reduced Uh Oh. What's Wrong with
this Picture?, supra note 215 (quoting Greg Sandoval, Exclusive: Apple-Samnsung JurorSpeaks out,
CNET NEWS (Aug. 25, 2012, 9:34 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13579 3-5750035837/exclusive-apple-samsung-juror-speaks-out/); Joel Rosenblatt et al., Apple-Samsung Jury May
Have Leaned on Engineer. Patent Holder. BLOONMERG (Aug. 25, 2012, 2:03 AM) http://
wwwv.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-25/"apple-saimsung-jury-may-have-leaned-on-engineer-patentholder.htil.
224. Dan Levine, Jury Didn't Want to Let Samsung off Easy in Apple Trial: Foreman.
REUTERS (Aug. 26, 2012, 1:21 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/25/us-apple-samsungjuror-idUSBRE87009U20120825 (internal quotation marks omitted).
225. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF ADVERSE INFERENCE INSTRUCTIONS

Case

Vodusek v. Baylie
226

Court Finding
of Culpability
for Spoliation

Adverse Inference Instruction and Discretion
Given to Jury
Spoliation

At least
If you find spoliation

Marine Corp.

willfulness

2
Zubulake I , 227

Willfulness

If you find spoliation

NVucor Corp. v. Bell2

least
8At
A
willfulness

If you find spoliation

Gross
negligence

"I instruct you, as a
matter of law, that each
of these plaintiffs failed
to preserve evidence after
its duty to preserv e
arose."

Intentional

If you find spoliation

Pension Committee of
the University of
MontrealPens ion
Plan v. Banc of
Anerica Securities,
LLC 229
Rimokus Consulting
Group, Ic. v.
Camnarata
E.I. du Pont de
Nenours & Co. v.
Kolon Industries,
Inc.231
Aaron v. Kroger
Limited Partnership

Intentional and
bad faith

Apple Inc. v. Samsung
Electronics Co.233
(magistrate judge)

Knowing and
1willful
Willful and
conscious
disregard

Apple Inc. v. Samsung
Electronics Co.
(district judge)

Willful and
conscious
disregard

Relevance/Prejudice
Then you "are permitted to, if
you feel justified in doing
so" infer prejudice
Then you "are permitted, but
not required," to infer
prejudice
Then you "are permitted, but
not required," to infer
prejudice
"As a result, you may
presume, if you so choose,
that such lost evidence was
relevant, and that it would
have been favorable to
the ... Defendants."

Then you may decide
whether to infer relevance
and prejudice
"T he jury should then he
spoliation
allowed to irfer that the
unrecoverae deleted
ato
stnict thats
occurred as a matter ofhelpful
law
to [plaintifo] and harmful to
[defendant]."
Instruct that spoliation
Then you may decide
occurred as a matter of
whether this finding is
determinative
law
Instnict that spoliation
Then you may presume
relevance and prejudice
occurred as a matter of
law
"Whsether this fact is
impr to you i
Instruct that spoliation
occurred as a matter of
a verdict in this case is for
law
you to decide."

226. 71 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 1995).
227. 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
228. 251 F.R.D. 191 (D.S.C. 2008).
229. 685 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), abrogatedby Chin. v. Port Auth.. 685 F.3d 135
(2d Cir. 2011).
230. 688 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
231. 803 F. Supp. 2d 469 (E.D. Va. 2011).
232. No. 2:10cv606. 2012 WL 78392 (E.D. Va. Jan. 6. 2012).
233. No. Cl 1-1846 LHK (PSG), 2012 WL 3042943 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2012).
234. No. I -CV-01846-LHK, 2012 WL 3627731 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2012).
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V. ANALYSIS: CRAFTING THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION
Even when the need for sanctions is clear, "the form those sanctions should
take presents a very difficult question."
The standards courts use as guides in
fashioning the appropriate sanction are obvious (in formulating a sanction, it is
important that "the trial court . .. strive to impose a sanction that fits the
inappropriate conduct" 6 ), broad (the sanction selected must meet "the norm of
proportionality"3 and "not test the limits of reason" 7), and even metaphorical
(Judges "should take pains neither to use an elephant gun to slay a mouse nor to
wield a cardboard sword if a dragon looms" ). All in all, they provide little
real substance. Some standards are more down to earth; for example, in Rimkus
Consulting Group, Inc. v. Caminmarata, the court stated that a sanction for
spoliation "should be no harsher than necessary to respond to the need to punish
or deter and to address the impact on discovery." 20 The foundational standard is
as follows:
The [applicable] sanction should be designed to: (1) deter parties from
engaging in spoliation; (2) place the risk of an erroneous judgment on
the party who wrongfully created the risk; and (3) restore "the
prejudiced party to the same position he would have been in absent the
wrongful destruction of evidence by the opposing party." 24
Still, the standards articulated in court decisions are often so broad that they do
not constrain or even guide the court's decisionmaking in a meaningful way. 2
These ambiguous standards are self-perpetuating, as courts continue to be as
protective over the discretionary standard for issuing sanctions as Smdagol was
over the ring of power.243 To quote one slippery-slope argument in defense of
the discretionary standard:

235. Haeger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. CV-05-02046-PIIX-ROS, 2012 WL
5896190, at *32 (D. Ariz. Nov. 8, 2012).
236. Brown v. Fed'n of State Med. Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1439 (7th Cir. 1987), abrogatedby
Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A.. 880 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1989).
237. Newman v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 962 F.2d 589. 591 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing
Mraovic v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co., 897 F.2d 268, 271 (7th Cir. 1990); Lorenzen v. Emps. Ret.
Plan of the Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 896 F.2d 228, 232 33 (7th Cir. 1990)). see also Bonds v.
District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 801. 808 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("The choice of sanction should be guided
by the concept of proportionality .... " (internal quotation marks omitted)).
238. Webb v. District of Columbia, 146 F.3d 964, 974 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
239. Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 395 (1st Cir. 1990).
240. 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 618 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
241. West v. Goodyear lire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting
Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
242. See, e.g., Anderson, 900 F.2d at 395 (describing the relevant standard in terms of guns,
swords, and dragons).
243. Smeagol was "once a member of a Hobbit group that lived along banks of the River
Anduin[, who] first came into contact with the Ring as a boy, after his friend D6agol discovered it

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

29

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 2
488

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 64: 459

There are obvious reasons which demonstrate why the criteria for
sanctions cannot be reduced to a formula or standardized test.....

[J]udicial decisions which are discretionary cannot be tied down to a
fixed rule or formula. If such were the case, courts would lose their
flexibility in the sanctions process, and discretion would lose its
meaning.
Despite the lack of formal guidelines in the realm of spoliation,245 a trend
has emerged in the federal district courts, which often have the "final" say on
motions for sanctions based on spoliation.
Beginning with Pension
Committee, many courts have instructed juries, as a matter of law, that spoliation
occurred after the court already found spoliation in the course of deciding a prior
247
motion for sanctions.
This trend signals recognition of the duplicity of factfinding labor noted in Nucor Corp. v. Bell when a court chooses to impose the
traditional adverse inference instruction.248 In Nucor. the court noted that while
a j udge must make findings of fact when ruling on a motion for sanctions, j udges
have typically permitted jurors to reweigh the evidence of spoliation at trial.
The traditional adverse inference instructions given at trial include conditional
language; jurors are instructed to determine for themselves whether spoliation
has occurred at all.2o The effect of this, the Nucor court noted, "makes little

by chance in the riverbed. ... He retreated to the caves under the mountains, where he lurked for
many centuries[, using] the Ring as a simple talisman of invisibility, unaware of its true power and
malevolence." James R. Coben, Gollum, leet Sineagol: A Schizophrenic Ruiniation on lediator
Values Beyond Self-Determination and Neutralitv 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 65, 67 & n.12
(2004) (quoting LORD OF THE RINGS: CHARACTER Bios, http://www.an gelfire.com/magic/marcp/
characterbios.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2013)).
244. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 167 F.R.D. 90, 102 (D. Colo. 1996).
245. At least one circuit has made strides towards identifying meaningfiul guiding principles.
In the Ninth Circuit. courts must apply the "least onerous sanction" when choosing among remedies
for spoliation of evidence. See Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 79 (3d Cir.
1994) (quoting JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE § 3.16, at 117 (1989)).
246. See, e.g., Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 202 (D.S.C. 2008) (citing Silvestri v.
General Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001)) ("[A] district court is granted broad
discretion to impose appropriate sanctions ... and the abuse of discretion standard accounts for the
judge's role as a fact-finder."); Scott v. IBM Corp., 196 F.R.D. 233, 248 (D.N.J. 2000)
("[S]poliation sanctions may be imposed as part of the inherent power of a district court to sanction
parties.").
247. See Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC,
685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 496 & n.251 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), abrogatedby Chin v. Port Auth., 685 F.3d 135
(2d Cir. 2012).
248. See Nucor Corp., 251 F.R.D. at 202 (noting the "inconsistency in how courts deal with
the division of fact-finding labor in spoliation cases").
249. See id. at 202, 203.
250. See, e.g., id at 203 & ii.10 (quoting Zubiulake 1, 229 F.R.D. 422, 439-40 (S.D.N.Y.
2004)) ("[T]he district court's charge [in Zubulake V| stated that the jury should decide whether the
defendant failed to produce relevant evidence and, if it answered that question affirmatively, then
decide whether to apply ain adverse inference.").
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sense when viewed in light of all the sanctions available to remedy spoliation of
evidence." 251
If a district court finds that a party spoliated evidence and sanctions that
conduct by giving an adverse inference charge, the spoliating party gets
an opportunity to re-argue the spoliation issue before the jury.
However, if a district court makes the same findings and chooses to
impose any other sanction, including the harsher sanctions of default
judgment or dismissal, the spoliating party is not afforded the same
opportunity.
The court noted this inconsistency to encourage courts and parties to
reconsider how the imposition of different spoliation sanctions may control who
judges the facts of the spoliation.2 Subsequent cases have begun to address this
inconsistency.
In Aaron v. Kroger Limited PartnershipI, the court found that
"[t]he fact-finding necessary to resolve the spoliation issue has ... already
occurred, thereby obviating any role for the jury on this matter." 255 The court,
however, distinguished Nucor, finding that "it does not-nor does any other
case-mandate" the result that a jury be permitted to reconsider whether a
spoliating party's conduct warrants an adverse inference instruction.256 The
propriety of this last quoted language is open for debate. The Vodusek v.
Bayliner Marine Corp. decision stated a clear preference for allowing the jury to
resolve some, if not all, of the spoliation issues: "Rather than deciding the
spoliation issue itself, the district court provided the jury with appropriate
guidelines for evaluating the evidence." 257 Given that Vodusek was cited in the
Kroger court's decision, it is dubious to suggest that no case mandates such a
result. 258
Indeed, Nucor was decided the way it was because "good authority trend[ed]
toward such an outcome." 259 Thus, if asked whether Nucor was rightly or
wrongly decided, the authors would give the quintessential lawyer's answer: "It
depends." At the time of the Nucor decision, clear precedent encouraged courts

251. Id at 203.
252. Id.
253. See id.
254. See, e.g., Aaron v. Kroger Ltd. P'ship 1, No. 2:10vc606, 2012 WL 78392, at *2 (E.D. Va.
Jan. 6, 2012) (noting that the court already considered evidence of spoliation, therefore reducing the
need for jury fact-finding).
255. Aaron, 2012 WL 78392, at *2.
256. See id. at *3.
257. Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 157 (4th Cir. 1995); see also id at 156
(noting that when an adverse inference instruction is given, the alleged spoliating "party's failure to
produce evidence may, of course, be explained satisfactorily").
258. See Aaron, 2012 WL 78392, at *2 (citing Buckley v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 306, 323 (4th
Cir. 2008); Vodusek, 71 F.3d at 157).
259. Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 203 (D.S.C. 2008).
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to let juries weigh all aspects of a spoliation issue.260 In light of more recent
cases, in which courts found that spoliation occurred and then instructed the jury
on that finding,261 the jury instruction on spoliation that the court decided to give
in Nucor might look quite different if it were given today.
The "if you find spoliation" instruction may not remain in vogue for long; as
the Sixth Circuit recognized, such an adverse inference instruction is "simply a
formalization of what the jurors would be entitled to do even in the absence of a
specific instruction."262 The practical problem with "permissive" inference
instructions is simply that jurors are free to disregard them. This issue becomes
even more apparent within the context of lengthy jury instructions, such as those
given in Apple v. Samsung.263 Even lawyers would have trouble following 109
pages of jury instructions-in the 4pple trial, the jurors were reportedly asked to
stand up periodically to ensure they remained awake.264 Imagine that within
those lengthy instructions was a two-sentence instruction that "Samsung
Electronics Company has failed to preserve evidence for Apple's use in this
litigation after its duty to preserve arose. Whether this fact is important to you in
reaching a verdict in this case is for you to decide."26 5 Without any indication as
to why this fact may be considered important, the natural tendency would be to
disregard the instruction and focus on the merits of the case. In such a case,
"[e]ven if a judge or magistrate determinates that spoliation has occurred and
orders an adverse inference instruction, the jury is nonetheless entitled to
disregard it in making its decision."266
the end, the "sanction" of an adverse
inference instruction, which is supposed to punish wrongdoing and have an "in
terroren effect" 267 would have no effect at all.
In Apple v. Samsung, Samsung had already been sanctioned over seven years
prior to the opinion for its automatic deletion of emails through the mySingle
system.268 The magistrate judge recognized the seriousness of Samsung's
evidence preservation failures as well as the spotlight opportunity to both punish
and deter sanctionable conduct.269 The charge he formulated instructs jurors of
the failure to prevent destruction of relevant evidence after Samsung's duty to
preserve arose; defines "spoliation of evidence"; instructs jurors that they may

260. See Vodusek. 71 F.3d at 156-57; Zubiulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422, 439-40 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
261. See supra Part IV.
262. West v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 374 F. App'x 624, 635 (6th Cir. 2010).
263. See Final Jury Instructions, supra note 221 (instructions totaled 109 pages).
264. See Jury Instructions in Apple v. Samsung, 109 Pages, GROKLAW (Aug. 21, 2012, 3:30
PM), http://www.groklaw .net/articlebasic.php?story =20120821152214965.
265. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. I I-CV-01846-LHK, 2012 WL 3627731, at *15
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2012).
266. James T. Killelea. Note, Spoliation of Evidence: Proposals for New York State, 70
BROOK. L. REv. 1045, 1060 n. 102 (2005).
267. Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
268. See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. C1 1-1846 LHK (PSG), 2012 WL 3042943, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2012) (citing Mosaid Techs. Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d
332, 339-40 (D.N.J. 2004)).
269. See id. at *8.
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presume relevance and prejudice; defines relevance; and notes that jurors may
find the failure to preserve evidence to be "determinative, somewhat
determinative, or not at all determinative in reaching your verdict."
On the
contrary, the revised charge formulated by the district court simply lets a bad
271
deed go unpunished2. One blogger recently argued:
I continue to believe that the facts in Samsung's case-given that the
Korean company already faced problems in U.S. litigation due to its
automatic deletion of emails seven years ago-were far more serious
than the ones in Apple's case.
Judge Koh certainly missed an
opportunity to show strength and treat companies differently if the facts
warrant it, even if the parties' conduct may appear comparable at the
highest level of abstraction.272
Indeed, the result of the spoliation battle in Apple v. Samsung may discourage
future litigants from raising legitimate spoliation concerns when their own ediscovery practices have been less than perfect.
The law of sanctions for spoliation of evidence continues to develop on a
case-by-case basis. Nearly fifty shades of adverse inference instructions have
emerged since the goldsmith's apprentice stole the chimney sweep boy's jewel
and the judge instructed the jury to "presume the strongest against him."
As a
result, calls have been made for a model adverse inference jury instruction.274
The authors submit that to clear up the inconsistency in the imposition of
adverse inference instructions, the first step of a traditional adverse inference
instruction should be eliminated. As noted in Nucor, when a court decides to
issue an adverse inference instruction, the dirty work has already been done, and
the court has decided that spoliation took place.275 Rather than allow a jury to
reinvent the wheel, the jury should be instructed, as a matter of law, of this
finding. This was the approach taken in Pension Committee and followed by

270. See id.
271. See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2012 WL 3627731, at
*15 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2012).
272. Sansung Successfully Neutralizes Adverse Inference Jury Instruction Concerning
Deleted Emails, Foss PATENTS (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/08/samsungsuccessfully -neutralizes.html.
273. Armory v. Delamirie, (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664, 664 (K.B.); I Strange 505.
274. See JOSEPH, supra note 7, 60 (Supp. 2012) (noting that at a 2010 Conference on Civil
Litigation at Duke Law School, sponsored by the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, a rule was proposed
that would provide a model jury instruction for adverse inference sanctions).
275. See Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 203 (D.S.C. 2008). This is the same process
that occurs when a judge applies an adverse inference instruction on summary judgment. See, e.g.,
Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Oracle Corp., 254 F.R.D. 559, 567 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (holding, on
motions for summary judgment, that plaintiffs were entitled to adverse inference instructions and
that the court would take such inferences into account when deciding the motions).
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district courts in Virginia and the magistrate j udge in Apple,276 and it eliminates
duplicative efforts by a judge thenjury. As two commentators recently stated:
The better practice would be to accept the trial court's findings of
spoliation and instruct the jury on the inference to be drawn. The jury's
role should be limited to deciding whether or not to draw an adverse
inference and how to weigh the inference with the balance of the
evidence. Spoliation instructions requiring juries to make a particular
factual finding before deciding whether to apply the adverse
inference ... should be avoided. Fact issues that could result in the
imposition of a soliation instruction should be resolved before the
charge conference.
The instructions ordered by Judge Scheindlin in Pension Committee and by
the magistrate judge in Apple should serve as bases for future adverse inference
instructions. In addition, such instructions should be given regardless of the
level of culpability so long as the judge finds the instruction to be the most
appropriate sanction.
As illustrated in the table above, instructions that
spoliation occurred as a matter of law have been imposed in cases of gross
negligence, willfulness, and bad faith.278 The focus should be on restoring the
evidentiary balance for the innocent party, and "[i]t makes little difference to the
party victimized by the destruction of evidence whether that act was done
willfully or negligently."279 The adverse inference instruction must be "adverse
to the destroyer not because of any finding of moral culpability, but because the
risk that the evidence would have been detrimental rather than favorable should
fall on the party responsible for its loss.",280 Only an instruction that eliminates
the ability of a jury to decide anew whether spoliation occurred will achieve the
"prophylactic, punitive, and remedial rationales underling the spoliation
doctrine."281
Based on the foregoing, the authors propose the following model adverse
inference instruction:

276. See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. CI 1-1846 LHK (PSG), 2012 WL 3042943, at
*8 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2012); Aaron v. Kroger Ltd. P'ship 1. No. 2:10cv606, 2012 WL 78392, at *2
(E.D. Va. Jan. 6, 2012); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc.. 803 F. Supp. 2d 469,
509 (E.D. Va. 2011); Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec.,
LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 496 & n1.251 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), abrogated by Chin v. Port Auth.. 685
F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012).
277. Rebecca Simmons & Michael J. Ritter, Texas's Spoliation "Presumption," 43 ST.
MARY's L.J. 691, 774 (2012).
278. See supra Table 1.
279. Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
280. Id.
281. West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999).
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I instruct you, as a matter of law, that [spoliating party] failed to
preserve evidence after its duty to preserve arose. The evidence is now
unrecoverable. This failure to preserve is known as the "spoliation of
evidence." In other words, spoliation is the destruction or material
alteration of evidence or the failure to preserve evidence for another's
use in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation. The failure to
preserve resulted from [spoliating party's] [level of culpability] in
performing its discovery obligations.
In deciding whether to sanction [spoliating party] for its conduct, I
chose to give you jurors an adverse inference instruction.
This
instruction is a serious sanction meant to punish [spoliating party], deter
similar future conduct, and level the playing field at trial for
[nonspoliating party].
Based on my finding of spoliation. you may presume that the lost
evidence would have been relevant and helpful to [nonspoliating
party's] case and would have been harmful to [spoliating party's] case.
Evidence is relevant if it would have clarified a fact at issue in the trial
and otherwise would naturally have been introduced into evidence.
It is up to you to decide the extent to which the lost evidence was
relevant and prejudicial. Of course, it is impossible to know exactly
what evidence was lost, so you must make these determinations to the
best of your ability based on the facts and circumstances of this case.
You must then decide what effect your finding should have in reaching
your verdict.
VI. CONCLUSION
In 1722, when a goldsmith's apprentice stole a jewel and refused to produce
it at trial, the judge instructed the jury to "presume the strongest against him." 282
This instruction was made in an age where it was a given that the trial judge's
instructions to the jury were "necessarily and properly of great weight," and the
"lightest word or intimation" was "received with deference" and often controlled
283
the outcome of the case.
In addition, the jury instructions were likely quite
brief. The effect of this instruction was clearly intended to be punitive.
Yet, 290 years later, in a highly complex trial over patent infringement with
billions of dollars at stake, the trial judge found that a defendant was culpable for
sanctionable soliation of ESI, but eventually gave no instruction to the jury on
this conduct.
While it is understandable that a court would decide not to give
instructions that cancel each other out, two wrongs still do not make a right.

282. Armory v. Delamirie, (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664, 664 (K.B.); I Strange 505.
283. Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 626 (1894) (citing Hicks v. United States, 150 U.S.
442, 452 (1893)).
284. See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. I I-CV-01846-LHK. 2012 WL 362773 1 at
*15 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2012).
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With e-discovery violations at an all-time high 285 now is the time to put
spoliators in their place and achieve the goal of deterrence. It is time to forego
jury instructions that allow jurors to consider anew whether spoliation occurred,
after a judge trained in the law has already made such a finding. In cases
involving corporate parties, instructing jurors in open court that a company
committed sanctionable spoliation of evidence will be a black mark on the
company's reputation, even if the jurors decide not to presume that the lost
evidence was relevant and prejudicial. One judge recently noted the need to take
such misconduct seriously:
Litigation is not a game. It is the time-honored method of seeking
the truth, finding the truth, and doing justice. When a corporation and
its counsel refuse to produce directly relevant information an opposing
party is entitled to receive, they have abandoned these basic principles
in favor of their own interests.286
The approach recommended by the authors will serve as an adequate deterrent
and most appropriately level the playing field for parties betrayed from a fair day
in court by spoliation of evidence.
The authors echo the call "for greater education regarding electronic
discovery"m8 in law school and through continuing legal education programs so
that lawyers can properly inform their clients and protect themselves from
sanctionable conduct, and so that judges can be ready to deal with complicated
sanctions motions such as the one brought in Nucor.
Because "[federal
courts have been increasingly willing to issue adverse [inference] jury
instructions in e-discovery spoliation cases in the recent past... counsel must
be cognizant of the client's duty to preserve evidence, implement an adequate
and effective litigation hold, be diligent in collecting and reviewing data, and
protect data from spoliation."2 89

285. Willoughby et al., supra note 22, at 790.

286. Haeger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. CV 05 02046 PHX ROS, 2012 WL
5896190, at *I (D. Ariz. Nov. 8, 2012); see also Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868,
903 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("What above all else is eroding public confidence in the Nation's
judicial system is the perception that litigation is just a game . . .
287. Tinkham & Janus, supra note 13, at 403.
288. Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 192 (D.S.C. 2008). The Nucor court held seven
hearings on the motion for spoliation of evidence, and the transcripts from those hearings total
1,005 pages.
289. Rachel K. Alexander, E-Discoverv Practice, Theory, and Precedent: Finding the Right
Pond, Lure, and Lines Without Going on a Fishing Expedition, 56 S.D. L. REV. 25, 82 83 (2011).
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